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Book Reviews
BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmERICAN IDEAL. By Alfred Lief.
New York: Stackpole Sons, 1936. Pp. 508.
It is common knowledge that Supreme Court decisions are inevitably in-
fluenced by the social and economic viewpoints of the individual justices, thus
making it highly important to study the personnel of the Court if one is to
understand its output. Perhaps no better subject for such a study has ever
existed than Mr. Justice Brandeis. His encyclopedic knowledge and profound
understanding of our social and economic systems, unequalled, perhaps, by any
other man in public life in this country, present or past, give reason and direc-
tion to his social and economic views so influential in the formulation of his
opinions, where a less well informed and less socially and economically minded
individual may find his opinions dictated by unconscious leanings or by political
and economic concepts thrust upon him by an early training. Not infrequently
described as a devoted adherent of Jeffersonian Democracy, Brandeis' conception
of the role of government in protecting those who find it impossible effectively
to protect themselves in our present-day economic and industrial set-up is in
great measure the counterpart of that of Jefferson in a simpler agricultural
society. From that angle, much that has been attempted by way of national
legislation in recent years to cope more effectively with big business, to protect
the interests of the public, and to place capital and labor more nearly on an
equal basis in the bargaining struggle, would seem to fit into his philosophy of
government. This is not to suggest that he had a direct part in formulating that
program or that the actual legislation is as he would have it. But certainly
his point of view and his influence had their effect upon those who did shape the
program. His influence has ever extended far beyond the law. With his master-
ful understanding of economic problems it is not strange that his leadership in
governmental affairs outside the Court should be constantly looked to.
No stauncher advocate of democracy has ever had a place upon our highest
court. At the same time his thorough and practical understanding of economic
enterprise, and his characteristic thoroughness, such as exemplified by his
memorable brief in Muller v. Oregon,1 lead one to think of him in terms of ef-
ficiency as well. Yet if the two seem to conflict, the choice is not difficult or de-
layed. It was Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the famous Myers case who
said, "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
1. 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
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power."2 Always vigilant in the cause of democracy, he makes no exceptions for
the Court itself. Like the late Mr. Justice Holmes, Brandeis is fully conscious
of the fact that the Court's power to obstruct or destroy by a ruling of un-
constitutionality is not offset by a similar constructive power. And further, like
Holmes, he believes in the necessity of legislative freedom to experiment if social
and economic problems are to be advanced toward intelligent solution, thus de-
manding that this power to obstruct or destroy, even in the name of the Constitu-
tion, be used only upon rare and urgent occasions. Perhaps this point of view
has not been better expressed than in his brilliant and memorable dissent in the
Oklahoma ice company case.
"There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs. . . . To stay experimentation in
things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right
to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.
. . . This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. ... But
in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest
we erect our prejudices into legal principles."3
As Brandeis' epoc-making brief in the case of Muller v. Orego. 4 became a
model for the later presentation of social and economic issues to the Supreme
Court, so his dissenting opinions in such cases as Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm.,5 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
Crowell v. Benson,7 and the St. Joseph Stock Yards case,8 to mention only a few,
stand among the most authoritative discussions of difficult social and economic
problems in the whole field of our legal literature. The same might be said of
the wiretapping dissent in the matter of personal liberty--"the right to be let
alone."'9
When President Woodrow Wilson presented his nomination to an associate
justiceship of the Supreme Court to the Senate, Brandeis was branded by
many as a dangerous radical and opposed by a great variety of leaders of public
opinion, including seven former presidents of the American Bar Association,
among whom were such men as Elihu Root and William Howard Taft. Yet this
friend and protector of the common people, unperturbed through it all, has at
all times, as a means of fostering and protecting democracy, held to an even
course midway between radicalism and conservatism, and won for himself a
place alongside the most respected and revered of the Justices who have ever
graced our Supreme Bench.
The Brandeis life story as written by Mr. Lief lays bare the forces which
account so vividly for his point of view and the purposes which have mo-
2. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926).
3. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
4. 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
5. 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
6. 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
7. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
8. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928).
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tivated his action since long before he came upon the Court, and makes
thoroughly understandable the position he takes in all of his opinions. Such a
service rendered with respect to one whose work has bulked so large and whose
influence is destined to go so far as that of Mr. Justice Brandeis is one for
which all lawyers and students of government may well be grateful. Other
biographies of the Justice have been written and no doubt still others of greater
compass are sure to follow, but the contribution of Mr. Lief will remain dis-
tinctly worthwhile.
University of Missouri School of Law ROBERT L. HOWARD
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JUIISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. Second
Edition. By Carl C. Wheaton. Rochester: The Lawyers Co-operative
Publishing Co., 1938. Pp. xiv, 656.
Here is a one volume library on the conduct of litigation in the federal
courts. After brief survey of the types of United States courts and their juris-
diction in general, the major portion of the book deals with the jurisdiction and
procedure of the district courts. This is followed by materials regarding the cir-
cuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Taking up but one inch of shelf
space, its leading cases, statutes, rules, forms, text and notes provide the basic
information as to how to get into, or keep out of, the federal courts and what to
do when one gets there. The detailed table of contents and the adequate index
make the work usable as a book of reference. If the lawyer whose practice is prin-
cipally confined to the state courts wishes a single volume in the field of federal
procedure, this is the one for him.
However, one should estimate the work primarily in the light of the purpose
for which it was prepared, namely as a vehicle for law school study of federal
jurisdiction and procedure. Certainly it differs markedly in several related re-
spects from other casebooks on the subject. First of all, probably no other modern
casebook on any subject has as large a proportion of pages taken up with
materials other than court opinions. No other casebook in the field goes into as
much detail in matters of federal jurisdiction. Finally, the materials are given-
in so far as they could be given at the time of publication-for pleading and
trying cases and taking appeals under the new rules.
The trend of books prepared for law school study is to use fewer pages of
opinions and more materials of other sorts. The book under review shows this
tendency to a greater degree than other recent casebooks, but both the subject
matter and the editor's plan of treatment warrant the allotment which has been
used. Nevertheless, decisions remain, and probably will remain, the principal
units of study in ordinary law school courses. Professor Wheaton's book con-
tains upwards of 130 principal cases and these alone would provide sufficient
materials upon which to center the discussion for 30 or 35 class meetings. The
[Vol. 4
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opinions are well chosen, though one misses a few familiar faces.1 Naturally
Swift v. Tyson is supplanted by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. A generous sprinkling
of district court opinions gives the book a rather earthy flavor. The cases are
skillfully, though sometimes severely, edited. Occasionally one is somewhat con-
fused by the fact that a large type note follows immediately after the opinion
without anything to indicate a break.2
There is no attempt in Professor Wheaton's book to present a philosophy of
federal jurisprudence by tracing the development of ideas in prevailing and
dissenting opinions. There is likewise no attempt to center the work around a
dozen or a score of judicial battle-grounds on particular topics. The book is de-
signed to show the full picture of what we have in the federal judicial system.
The teacher can be as philosophical as he wishes about that. The details which
the editor supplies can be used for such a development, or can be treated purely
as matters of additional routine information.
On first thought, it is rather startling to notice that the work contains more
sub-divisions than principal cases. Frequently a section will contain only a stat-
ute, a rule, or a note. The subject of "amount in controversy" may be taken
as typical of the method of treatment. There are four principal cases placed
under four sub-sections, the titles to which indicate the subject matter of the
cases. In addition the notes contain references to perhaps a hundred cases with
holdings stated briefly, the gist of numerous periodical articles, and a few other
matters.
Throughout the book the editor's notes are so complete that it is certainly
not profitable for the teacher to present problems based upon sources not con-
tained in the student's book. This imparting of detailed information in the case-
book has the advantage of permitting the teacher to start with an analysis
of the materials given and proceed either to build up a beautiful synthesis of the
authorities, or, as frequently happens in this and other fields, to be obliged to
admit irreconcilable discord. The editor has not tried to put federal procedure in
a nutshell. There is plenty of stimulating work left for the individual teacher.
In the absence of cases under the new federal rules, the editor has included
the rules themselves and statements as to their sources, together with the official
forms. Many of them deal with the problems which are discussed in the standard
courses in pleading, evidence, and practice. Is it likely that law school curricula
will give general courses in these subjects without reference to the new federal
rules? This scarcely seems probable. Already teachers are groping for methods
to bring the new rules into the general procedural courses. In a couple of years
there will be little need to call these matters to the students' attention again in
the course of federal procedure. However, as the book under review appears in
1. Such as McCormick v. Sullivant, Sheldon v. Sill, Ex parte Young,
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., Barney v. Latham, Kline v. Burke Construc-
tion Co.
2. Pp. 21, 102, and perhaps pp. 39, 198, 235, 339, 492.
1939]
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a transitional period, it is wise to include all the rules in the casebook. In addi-
tion they take little space and their presence adds to the completeness of the
work even if little attention is given to some of them in the course on federal
procedure.
Throughout, the work bears evidence of Professor Wheaton's careful scholar-
ship and thorough knowledge of the field. Apparently he has firm convictions
upon the manner in which the subject should be presented for study. This plan
has necessitated departure from tradition, both in form and in scope of topics
treated. He has the courage to carry through these convictions. Without the
advantage of the acid test of use of the book in the class-room the reviewer
suspects that the editor has made a valuable contribution upon the general prob-
lem of presenting specialized fields of the law to third year students.
University of Missouri, School of Law THOMAS E. ATmINSON
SIn WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. By David A. Lockmiller, Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1938. Pp. xviii, 308.
On October 25, 1758, after five years of lecturing at Oxford on English
law, Dr. William Blackstone began his Vinerian lectures which in turn paved
the way for his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). The lectures, the
first of their kind, were immensely significant, but the Commentaries were even
more so. So extensive indeed has been their influence that the man Blackstone
has long been obliterated by his own smoothly flowing periods. Having taught
jurisprudence to speak the language of the scholar and the gentleman, Black-
stone blended insensibly into his own reputation. This fate, shared in one way
and another with many diverse personalities, is perhaps not unwarranted if con-
clusions may be drawn from the present volume. Blackstone, whatever his
own qualifications, had greatness thrust upon him through the authorship of a
work that struck a popular fancy and fulfilled a genuine need. In personality,
he appears to have lacked the salt and sap that makes Coke, for example, stand
out from his crabbed dogmatisms.
Unfortunately, the present volume does little to rescue the man from
oblivion. Of the rather brief total, one-third is given over to appendices many
of which have a negligible value. The biography itself is vitiated by a style
and outlook which, never more than mediocre, at times borders on the infantile.
Verbosity, monotony, and crudities of expression mar almost every page. In
preparation, the author evidently attempted to acquire a knowledge of back-
ground. The result is painful. Time and again, he throws in passages far too
elementary for a schoolboy, even one much less precocious than Macaulay's.
Random and often misleading gestures concerning the social and political atmo-
sphere of the eighteenth century possess no virtue. Who, furthermore, needs
to be told that the common law is "one of the great legal systems of the world?"
[Vol. 4
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Almost every feature of the book shows signs of haste and carelessness, not ex-
cluding the proof-reading. Moreover, despite some rather pretentious, almost
sophomoric, claims as to sources of information, only a casual check is necessary
to show that without Clitherow's preface to Blackstone's reports, Odgers's article
in the Yale Law Journal, and an early Biographical History, this volume would
have been very, very slim.
In fine, the author has boggled an excellent opportunity to write a definitive
life of an influential jurist. Despite an admirably comprehensive view of
Blackstone's career, he has largely failed to integrate the man with his time.
He has scanted Blackstone's place in English legal and constitutional history
and in eighteenth century civilization. By this neglect, the volume has value
neither for the lawyer nor for the historian; and the complete lack of literary
charm destroys the "popular" appeal. We should like to know, for example, why
a Blackstone appeared, how he influenced his own and later generations, and
much more about his critics who were more numerous and shrewd than this
volume indicates. Indeed, we should have liked a full length portrait of an in-
fluential man, cast against a large and detailed background. Instead, we are
given a sort of sugar-plum puppet performing woodenly against an amateurishly
constructed backdrop.
Associate Professor of History
University of Missouri CHARLES F. MuLLsrr
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